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Abstract: University patenting has become an important research outcome in the 
past few decades. There has been an increase in the number of faculty patents and 
individual scientists listed as inventors on patent applications. The effective 
allocation of funding to universities is of great concern to policymakers. In this 
paper, we evaluate whether an increase in government funding for academic 
scientists enhances the performance of researchers in both scientific publications 
and academic patents or if this merely increases publications in the academic 
realm. We provide summary statistics from nanotechnology data in Quebec, 
compare it with other provinces in Canada, and build econometric models of 
various publication, patenting and grant databases. The analysis illustrates the 
strong relationship between funding and publication productivity as well as the 
citation impact of publications. In the light of research performance in patenting 
activities of academic researchers, this empirical study finds a strong influence on 
the number of patents. Moreover, increased funding appears to strengthen the 
citation impact of patents in Quebec, which affects the citation impact of patenting 
activities.  
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Introduction 
Universities have traditionally disclosed research findings and openly disseminated 
knowledge (Partha and David, 1994).  Academic researchers have gained a strong 
reputation for generating fundamental discoveries that transfer knowledge among 
scientists via publications. (David, 1998). In recent years, however, the academic research 
environment has changed dramatically through a growing interest in patenting and 
commercialization activities. 
Academic scientists have shown an increased interest in patenting and licensing activities, 
demonstrated through university-industry interactions. These interactions have been 
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facilitated by intellectual property rights regulations in universities such as the Bayh-Dole 
Act and Stevenson-Wydler Act in the US, the 1998 Decree in Flanders, Belgium, and 
changes to German law in 2001, etc. These regulations have granted university researchers 
intellectual property rights to commercialize the results from government-funded research 
(Van Looy et al., 2006). Universities have therefore become the main knowledge-
generating institutes that stimulate economic growth through knowledge production and 
innovation. Kodama and Branscomb (1999), for example, highlight the critical 
contribution of universities in rapid growth areas (biotechnology, software, medicine, 
nanotechnology, microelectronics, etc.) which are closely connected to the science base 
and require the latest research findings.  Although increased patenting in academia raises 
concerns related to decreased publication rates and other issues stemming from university-
industry relationships, these commercial interests can be used to measure the effectiveness 
of research funding (Geuna et al., 2003). 
These commercial interests can provide a new measure of the funding effectiveness. It is 
argued that funding affects the performance and evaluation of research and plays a crucial 
role in future economic and social development. Pavitt (2000), therefore, suggests that 
policy makers must recognize that funding academic research can produce high-quality 
results and major technological opportunities. Hence, current science policies should 
consider both scientific and technological outputs in measuring the rate of return from 
academic funded research. Nanotechnology, for example, may be the most promising high 
technology in this century. It has attracted substantial funding over the last few decades, 
and governments must efficiently allocate research funding to benefit from its economic 
potential. 
The impact of government research funding on academic patenting, however, has only 
been considered in a few studies (Arora and Gambardella, 2005; Carter et al., 1987; Foltz 
et al., 2000; Jacob and Lefgren, 2011), and the positive effect is not that clear and has not 
been found in all studies. Additionally, in terms of the influence that funding can have on 
academic research, academic publications have so far received more attention than 
patents.  
In this empirical study, we examine government funding for nanotechnology research in 
Quebec and all other provinces in Canada and ask the following questions:  
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• Does financial support boost both publication and patent productivity?  
• Does government funding positively influence the citation impact of both 
publications and patents in universities?  
• Do policy makers need to place greater emphasis on the productivity of academic 
technological outputs?  
Our study seeks to better understand how government funding impacts scientific and 
technological activities in universities. The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. We outline and describe prior studies in the next section. Section 3 focuses on 
data, methods and measures. Section 4 discusses the research findings and implications, 
and finally, conclusions, limitations of this study and future research are provided in 
Section 5.  
Literature Review  
Universities have historically been the main source of new knowledge, but over the past 
century, they have also become essential for industrial progress (Rosenberg, 2002). They 
commit to open science and their mission is to advance and disseminate knowledge, 
however, they have also become directly involved in patenting and commercialization 
activities throughout much of the 20th century after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act 
(Mowery and Sampat, 2001).  
According to Fox (1983), publication is the most fundamental research output of scientific 
community in universities; in addition to diffusing knowledge, it allows scientists to gain 
professional advancement, recognition and promotion. Hence, this can be an appropriate 
indicator to measure scientific productivity and performance of academic researchers. 
Counting publications and citations are appropriate techniques as they are indicators of 
productivity and can be used to evaluate scientific activity (Narin, 1976). High 
performance researchers are generally identified from their scientific production and the 
number of citations their papers receive (Alonso et al. 2010; Kosmulski, 2011). 
Bibliometric indicators are commonly used to evaluate research performance and provide 
a quick impression of the quality of research. Citation analyses generate relatively short-
term quantifiable measures based on an assumption of a linear relationship between 
scientific quality and citation counts.  
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Since patenting derived from public funded university research has dramatically increased 
in recent years, academic technological output has come into the focus of governments 
(Jaffe, 1989; Henderson et al., 1998). Patent counts and patent citations are also 
commonly accessible and viable measures to capture the innovative performance of 
inventors, and many studies consider them as reasonable measures of innovative activity 
(Cantwell and Hodson, 1991; Griliches, 1998; Patel and Pavitt, 1995).  
There are however a number of limitations regarding the use of publication and patents 
and their citations. For example Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2005) indicate that researchers 
may write reports instead of journal articles. Critics such as Adler et al. (2009) highlight 
that citation analysis does provide worthwhile information and should be part of the 
evaluation process, but not its sole measure. Poomkottayil et al. (2011) also raised the 
problem of disparity in citation rates of papers published in English compared to other 
languages. 
According to Bornmann and Leydesdorff (2013), research quality is a complex attribute 
for which no single specific formula exists to quantify its quality. Citation-based 
indicators are nonetheless widely acknowledged as quality metrics and assess the 
influence of research (Leydesdorff, 2009). Daim et al. (2006) point out that patents are 
vastly different in their importance, a fact that patent counts cannot capture. As a 
consequence, patent citations present a measure of patent quality based on the 
presumption that the impact of a patent is correlated with the number of times it is cited in 
other patents as their relevant prior art (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003). 
Despite these limitations in using publications and patents as proxies of academic 
productivity, they are considered to be appropriate indicators. For example, although 
Arundel and Kabla (1998) and Mansfield (1986) raise some critical concerns on the 
general use of patents as a measure of innovative performance, they suggest using these 
indicators in many high technology fields.  
Although sources of academic research funding shifted to include more funding from 
companies in the industry, federally funded research contribute to substantial amount of 
academic research (Fabrizio and Di Minin, 2008). Over recent years, increasing 
commercially oriented activities in academia has attracted industry involvement and 
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private financing for research. Nevertheless, public funding is still the prominent source of 
funding for university research particularly for the high technologies.  
Although academic research has become increasingly industry funded, a substantial 
amount is still federally funded (Fabrizio and Di Minin, 2008). According to Bard (2014), 
the future of high technologies is strongly attached to government-funded academic 
centers. Salter and Martin (2000) review the economic benefits of publicly funded 
research and show that there is extensive evidence on economic benefits of such 
government-funded research.  Liefner (2003), however, highlights that universities are 
expected to produce high quality research yet their research outputs are bound by the 
constraints of government funding. Many governments have implemented mechanisms to 
base funding on academic performance, specifically policies related to emerging 
technologies. Policy makers, therefore, play an important role in shaping the future of 
fields such as nanotechnology. 
It is pertinent to understand scientific research funding given its important role in 
technological change. Research sponsors are more likely to value the usefulness of 
research in topics that are more demand driven for private sectors. The role of universities 
has greatly evolved and academic researchers currently experience pressure from industry 
to produce short-term applied knowledge (Gibbons et al., 1994; Goldfarb et al., 2009). In 
the past, researchers used to determine their research goals and the intent of funding was 
to support the researcher, but now sponsors fund the research that fits their programs. 
According to Goldfarb (2008), the objectives of sponsors influence the research results 
and their publications and subsequent citations. However, the growing involvement of 
universities in commercialization activities has also attracted more attention to academic 
patenting and to extent stimulated academic patenting (Mowery et al., 2001).  
Debates still remain on the relationship between patenting and publications as some 
scholars have found a positive relationship (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Breschi et al, 
2007). Meyer (2006) explored this relationship for the field of nanotechnology and found 
that inventor-authors who both publish and patent are more productive, however these 
researchers are not among the most highly cited authors. 
The influence of government funds that are spent on university research on economic 
performance is of great importance. Jaffe et al. (1998) examined government-awarded 
	 6 
patents and studied their subsequent citations to analyze technological impact and 
knowledge spillovers. The government has devoted substantial resources to support 
university patents (Gieger, 1993), however the correlation between research funding and 
patents is still ambiguous. For example, Payne and Siow (2003) observed mixed results 
with respect to this relationship. Using a simple OLS model, they observed that an 
increase in federal funding results in more patents, but under a Tobit model, they found 
this relationship had a minor and imprecise impact. Azagra-Caro et al. (2006) studied 
patent production and showed that university-owned patents are more likely to benefit 
from public funding compared to non-university-owned patents which are more 
responsive to industrial funding. Additionally, Foltz et al. (2001) studied federal and state 
funding for agricultural biotechnology patents and observed that only state funding is 
significantly positive. 
Data and Methodology 
This research is based on various sources of funding, publication and patent data. 
Publication data was extracted from Elsevier’s Scopus, which contains all information 
pertaining to authors, citations, affiliations, etc. We have extracted patents from the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) instead of the Canadian Intellectual 
Property Office (CIPO) to account for a larger market, as Canadian inventors wish to 
commonly protect their patents in the United States. We deliberately chose keywords to 
extract only nanotechnology-related publications and patents and to clearly identify 
individuals in Canada using their affiliations.  
Furthermore, funding data was provided by a government-managed system. We merged 
these databases to obtain data for a 20-year period (1985-2005), and then invested a 
considerable amount of effort to clean the data, and eliminate duplicate individuals and 
possible ambiguities. We defined four dependent variables for publications and patents; 
two variables account for the number of these outputs (NumberPaper, NumberPatents) 
and two measure the number of citations received after 5 years to measure their citation 
impact (CitationPaper, CitationPatent). Additionally, to take into account the time 
discrepancy between the investment period and the eventual outcome, we include a one-
year lag for research funding and publishing / patenting in our econometric models and 
measure them with the PublicFunding variable in our models. To account for the time 
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periods for processing a patent application, we use the application year to count the 
number of patents, but for the citations we must use the grant year. Additionally, we 
include a cumulative number of patents for each scientist in the past three years 
(PastPatents). 
We recognize that research funding is an endogenous variable given that scientists who 
received more funding in the past are recognized as higher quality scientists and are more 
likely to receive more funding in the future. To correct the model for this endogeneity, we 
include instrumental variables to estimate our funding variable using Two-Stage Residual 
Inclusion (2SRI), as suggested by a number of scholars (Cai, et al. 2011; Terza et al. 
2008). 
Additionally, a number of instrumental variables were added to our econometric model: a 
cumulative number of articles for each scientist in the past three years (PastPapers), an 
ordinal indicator (ResearchChair) as a proxy of scientist quality which takes the value of 0 
if a researcher has never held a research chair, the value 1 for being an industrial chair, the 
value 2 for being a research chair of one of two Canadian federal granting councils, and 
the value 3 if a scientist is a Canadian research chair. The other instrument that we use in 
our model is the career age (CareerYears) of a scientist since his/her first nanotechnology-
related patent or publication. We also control the relationship between scientists in co-
publication and co-invention social networks to measure the effect of these relationships. 
Two variables are defined for co-publications (BetweennessPublication 
ClusteringPublication) and two for co-invention relationships (BetweennessPatent, 
ClusteringPatent). BetweennessPublication/Patent illustrates the importance of a 
researcher who is a necessary information intermediary between	 various parts of the 
network. Accordingly, scientists with higher betweenness are critical to collaboration 
within a scientific or technological network (Brandes, 2001). The other network variables 
quantify how well connected the neighbors of a researcher are in a network. The clustering 
coefficient describes the tendency to form connected subgroups in a network and 
measures the extent to which researchers tend to cluster together (Zhang et al., 2008). 
We employ a Probit model to estimate the increase in probability attributed to a one-unit 
increase in a given predictor. The Probit model constrains the estimated probabilities to 
between 0 and 1, which means that an increase in the predictor leads to an 
	 8 
increase/decrease in the predicted probability (Ai and Norton, 2003). To use the Probit 
model in this empirical study, we define dummy variables for the number of papers (dart) 
which take a value of 1 if the number of papers for a researcher in a given year t is greater 
than 0; otherwise it takes a value of 0. Similarly, we define other dummies for the number 
of patents (dpat), paper /patent citations (dcit). Eq.1 and Eq.2 present our econometric 
models: 
dartit
dcitit
!
"
#
$
%
&
= f
ln(PublicFundingit−1),PastPatentsit−1,
ln(103 ×betweennessPublicationit−2 ),
ln(104 ×ClusteringPublicationit−2 )
)
*
+
+
+
,
-
.
.
.
      (1) 
 
dpatit
dcitit
!
"
#
$
%
&
= f
ln(PublicFundingit−1),PastPatentsit−1,
ln(103 ×betweennessPatentit−2 ),
ln(104 ×ClusteringPatentit−2 )
)
*
+
+
+
,
-
.
.
.
                                          (2)	
Results and discussion  
This paper uses nanotechnology data in Quebec and other provinces in Canada to estimate 
the impact of public funding on academic publications and patents. The results on the 
impact of funding on publications are presented in Table 1 and Table 2, and those 
regarding patents are shown in Table 3 and Table 4. 
The analysis illustrates a strong relationship between funding and publication 
productivity, implying that an increase in the amount of grants leads to an increase in the 
probability of publishing. We control the possible endogeneity of public funding with the 
2SRI model and our instrument variables are all significant. This determines that our two-
step procedure corrects the potential endogenous problem. In terms of citation impact, we 
only observe this strong positive coefficient in Quebec but not in the other provinces. We 
also find that our network variables are significant and influence the probability of 
publishing articles and being cited. Further, collaboration is seen to enhance the 
probability of publishing through knowledge sharing.  
In light of academic researchers' involvement in commercial activities, academic patents 
appear to benefit from an increase in research funding. This observation suggests that 
government funding has a positive impact on technological activities. We observe that 
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increasing grants for scientists increases the probability of patenting, but we only find a 
positive impact on the probability of getting cited in Quebec and not in the other 
provinces.  
Table 1. Second Stage of regression results – Impact of government funding on the 
number of nanotech papers in Quebec 
Variables 
dart  dcit 
1-1 
(NO End.) 
1-2 
(2SRI)  
2-1 
(NO End.) 
2-2 
(2SRI) 
ln(PublicFundingit-1) 
0.0779 *** 0.2311 ***  0.0138  0.0998 *** 
(0.0266)  (0.0327)   (0.0251)  (0.0294)  
[ln(PublicFundingit-1)]2
 -0.0067 ** -0.0088 ***  0.0004  -0.0008  
(0.0027)  (0.0027)   (0.0025)  (0.0025)  
PastPatentsit-1 
0.0737 ** 0.0826 **  0.0899 *** 0.0956 *** 
(0.0347)  (0.0357)   (0.0309)  (0.0309)  
[PastPatentsit-1]2
 
-0.0021 * -0.0026 **  -0.0021 * -0.0025 ** 
(0.0012)  (0.0012)   (0.0011)  (0.0011)  
ln(104 x BetweennessPublicationit-2)  
0.1515 *** 0.1624 ***  0.1385 *** 0.1454 *** 
(0.0405)  (0.0403)   (0.0362)  (0.0360)  
ln(103 x ClusteringPublicationit-2)
 0.7934 *** 0.6478 ***  1.0563 *** 0.9731 *** 
(0.0955)  (0.0970)   (0.0846)  (0.0855)  
[ln(103 x ClusteringPublicationit-2)]2 
-0.1081 *** -0.0880 ***  -0.1461 *** -0.1347 *** 
(0.0140)  (0.0142)   (0.0124)  (0.0125)  
residual[ln(PublicFundingit-1)] 
               -0.1419 ***                 -0.0788 *** 
               (0.0177)                  (0.0149)  
Constant -0.1856 *** -0.5760 ***  -1.1857 *** -1.4066 *** 
(0.0265)  (0.0524)   (0.0287)  (0.0486)  
Years Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Nb observations 13968  13968   13968  13968  
Nb groups 1164  1164   1164  1164  
Loglikelihood -7681.46  -7600.98   -5362.88  -5344.41  
χ2
	 1423.73 *** 1405.60 ***  819.43 *** 861.51 *** 
Note: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels and Standard errors are 
presented in parentheses 
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Table 2. Second Stage of regression results – Impact of government funding on the 
number of nanotech papers in other provinces in Canada  
Variables 
dart  dcit 
1-1 
(NO End.) 
1-2 
(2SRI)  
2-1 
(NO End.) 
2-2 
(2SRI) 
ln(PublicFundingit-1) 
0.1013 *** 0.3019 ***  -0.0267 * 0.0194  
(0.0165)  (0.0202)   (0.0157)  (0.0178)  
[ln(PublicFundingit-1)]2
 -0.0086 *** -0.0104 ***  0.0039 ** 0.0035 ** 
(0.0017)  (0.0017)   (0.0016)  (0.0016)  
PastPatentsit-1 
0.0285  0.0113   0.0922 *** 0.0882 *** 
(0.0209)  (0.0228)   (0.0193)  (0.0197)  
[PastPatentsit-1]2
 
-0.0002  0.0011   -0.0023 ** -0.0021 * 
(0.0009)  (0.0010)   (0.0011)  (0.0011)  
ln(104 x BetweennessPublicationit-2)  
0.2177 *** 0.2530 ***  0.1917 *** 0.2000 *** 
(0.0278)  (0.0271)   (0.0248)  (0.0246)  
ln(103 x ClusteringPublicationit-2)
 0.5818 *** 0.2811 ***  1.0175 *** 0.9495 *** 
(0.0647)  (0.0660)   (0.0600)  (0.0609)  
[ln(103 x ClusteringPublicationit-2)]2 
-0.0764 *** -0.0350 ***  -0.1420 *** -0.1327 *** 
(0.0095)  (0.0096)   (0.0088)  (0.0089)  
residual[ln(PublicFundingit-1)] 
               -0.1978 ***                 -0.0449 *** 
               (0.0106)                  (0.0084)  
Constant -0.1425 *** -0.5965 ***  -1.1929 *** -1.2961 *** 
(0.0141)  (0.0268)   (0.0162)  (0.0230)  
Years Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Nb observations 44664  44664   44664  44664  
Nb groups 3722  3722   3722  3722  
Loglikelihood -24005.8  -23460.0   -15655.0  -15636.1  
χ2
	 4742.38 *** 4672.04 ***  2187.05 *** 2229.66 *** 
Note: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels and Standard errors are 
presented in parentheses 	
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Table 3. Second Stage of regression results – Impact of government funding on the 
number and citation of nanotech patents in Quebec   
Variables 
dpat dcit 
1-1 
(NO End.) 
1-2 
(2SRI) 
2-1 
(NO End.) 
2-2 
(2SRI) 
ln(PublicFundingit-1) 
0.2027 *** 0.2685 *** 0.1473  0.3158 ** 
(0.0552)  (0.0601)  (0.1099)  (0.1335)  
[ln(PublicFundingit-1)]2
 -0.0201 *** -0.0210 *** -0.0161  -0.0202 * 
(0.0055)  (0.0055)  (0.0109)  (0.0109)  
PastPatentsit-1 
0.1875 *** 0.1950 *** 0.3022 *** 0.3260 *** 
(0.0313)  (0.0309)  (0.0505)  (0.0499)  
[PastPatentsit-1]2
 
-0.0031 *** -0.0034 *** -0.0054 *** -0.0064 *** 
(0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)  
ln(104 x BetweennessPatentit-2)  
0.1713  0.1543  0.0340  0.0078  
(0.1914)  (0.1942)  (0.2058)  (0.2107)  
ln(103 x ClusteringPatentit-2)
 0.1926  0.2150  0.5991 ** 0.6542 ** 
(0.1908)  (0.1926)  (0.2584)  (0.2552)  
[ln(103 x ClusteringPatentit-2)]2 
-0.0279  -0.0319  -0.0734 ** -0.0831 ** 
(0.0277)  (0.0280)  (0.0369)  (0.0367)  
residual[ln(PublicFundingit-1)] 
               -0.0633 **                -0.1359 *** 
               (0.0279)                 (0.0413)  
Constant 
-0.2549 *** -0.4424 *** -2.9188 *** -3.3936 *** 
(0.0583)  (0.0777)  (0.1686)  (0.2568)  
Years Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Nb observations 3456  3456  3456  3456  
Nb groups 288  288  288  288  
Loglikelihood -1914.92  -1908.43  -254.25  -250.48  
χ2
	 296.16 *** 312.26 *** 542.20 *** 528.45 *** 
Note: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels and Standard errors are 
presented in parentheses 
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Table 4. Second Stage of regression results – Impact of government funding on the 
number and citation of nanotech patents in other provinces in Canada   
Variables 
dpat dcit 
1-1 
(NO End.) 
1-2 
(2SRI) 
2-1 
(NO End.) 
2-2 
(2SRI) 
ln(PublicFundingit-1) 
0.1274 *** 0.2784 *** 0.0103   0.1203  
(0.0464)  (0.0541)  (0.0776)  (0.0854)  
[ln(PublicFundingit-1)]2
 -0.0122 *** -0.0135 *** -0.0010  -0.0019  
(0.0047)  (0.0049)  (0.0077)  (0.0077)  
PastPatentsit-1 
0.1469 *** 0.1490 *** 0.3790 *** 0.3801 *** 
(0.0255)  (0.0253)  (0.0366)  (0.0365)  
[PastPatentsit-1]2
 
-0.0044 *** -0.0039 *** -0.0122 *** -0.0118 *** 
(0.0013)  (0.0013)  (0.0019)  (0.0019)  
ln(104 x BetweennessPatentit-2)  
-0.0379  -0.0469  -0.3220 ** -0.3354 ** 
(0.0939)  (0.0967)  (0.1413)  (0.1420)  
ln(103 x ClusteringPatentit-2)
 0.0899  0.0995  0.6433 *** 0.6492 *** 
(0.1097)  (0.1090)  (0.1367)  (0.1337)  
[ln(103 x ClusteringPatentit-2)]2 
-0.0138  -0.0160  -0.0835 *** -0.0850 *** 
(0.0161)  (0.0160)  (0.0200)  (0.0196)  
residual[ln(PublicFundingit-1)] 
               -0.1495 ***                -0.1071 *** 
               (0.0233)                 (0.0324)  
Constant -0.1045 *** -0.4788 *** -2.9877 *** -3.2777 *** 
(0.0351)  (0.0582)  (0.1573)  (0.1840)  
Years Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Nb observations 7104  7104  7104  7104  
Nb groups 592  592  592  592  
Loglikelihood -4273.64  -4215.58  -572.64  -568.91  
χ2
	 517.89 *** 513.83 *** 451.08 *** 483.68 *** 
Note: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels and Standard errors are 
presented in parentheses 
 
Additionally, we take into account the non-linear impact of funding on the probability of 
academic outputs. Figure 1a and Figure 1b show this impact on the publication 
probability. While we observe that the probability of publishing rises as government 
funding increases, more interestingly, our results show a negative coefficient of the 
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quadratic measure of funding on the probability of patenting. Our findings show that in 
simple models the influence of funding on the probability of patenting is positive, but 
when we increase the complexity of the model by adding its quadratic term, the results 
reflect a limited positive effect of funding on the probability of patenting. Beyond the 
maximum value, the graphs exhibit a negative relationship for Quebec while this 
decreasing effect is about to start in other provinces in Canada. 
This observation highlights that if researchers “too much” receive funding in any given 
year, the probability of increasing their technological output will not continue to increase, 
at some point, this probability will start to decrease (see Figure 1c). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  The non-linear impact of funding on the probability of publishing in (a) Quebec, (b) other provinces in 
Canada, on the probability of patenting in (c) Quebec, (d) other provinces in Canada 
We also include two non-linear effects of ClusteringPublications and ClusteringPatents in 
our models to examine the efficiency of clustered networks from an empirical point of 
view. The results show that researcher’s past collaboration positively influences 
subsequent knowledge productivity. However, too much clustering in the co-publication 
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and co-invention networks would not be fruitful. While we observe a positive impact of 
clustering on the probability of publishing, and on the probability of getting cited in 
papers and patents, this relationship exhibits diminishing returns with increasingly more 
clustered networks.   
Finally, including the number of patents filed by researchers in the past three years shows 
that the impact of patenting follows an inverted U shaped curve on the probability of 
publishing, patenting and getting cited. This suggests that at first patents tend to reinforce 
the productivity of researchers, but contributing to a greater number of patents would then 
imply a negative impact. 
 
Conclusion  
Responses to our research questions have high policy relevance given that academic 
research might need to rely on government funding in terms of enhancing scientific 
performance and technological activities. Universities have historically fostered open 
science and shared knowledge, yet patenting activities have become increasingly common 
in recent decades. Concerted efforts must be made to better understand the determinants 
that increase innovative productivity and scientific performance. In this paper, we examine 
academic productivity using panel data for publications, patents and grants that were 
allocated to academic researchers. We also analyze the diverse roles of universities in the 
economic system. These contributions examine the quality of academic outputs, which 
focuses on the citation impact of publications and patents in following years. 
Our results have numerous implications on emerging technology and universities given 
that academic research relies on government funding to enhance scientific performance 
and conduct patenting activities. We argue that government financial support facilitates 
higher performance in academia, and that the effect is strong for both publications and 
patents. Additionally, our paper aims to further understand the role of collaboration in 
enhancing researcher productivity. 
This research reveals two insights into government funding of academic technological 
outputs within universities: first, the government must find ways to efficiently allocate 
financial resources to universities. Our results show that a mere increase in research 
funding does not always increase research production and citation impact as we observed 
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a clear limitation. Given funding constraints, strategists and policy makers must measure 
the  productivity  of funding  programs in  various fields to strategicaly foster economic 
development. 
Second, since several  government funding  programs strongly encourage academic 
research in high technology fields, and considering the lack of financial sources, a specific 
mechanism is required to enhance innovation productivity of academic researchers. 
To sum up, our analysis reveals that public funding greatly enhances technological outputs 
in the academic realm.  However, industry funding  or  government-industry research 
programs can influence  on  producing academic patents that may translate into 
economicaly successful industry products. 
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